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memorandum focuses on the development of intangible property as a means to satisfy Section 
109(a). 
I. Courts Broadly Interpret the Property Requirement Under Section 109(A) 
A.  Chapter 7 and Chapter 11: The Peppercorn Analysis 
In In re McTague, the court held, since the statute was neither vague nor ambiguous, a 
reading of the plain meaning of the statute meant there was no minimum amount of property 
required to satisfy Section 109(a).4 The court stated that it had “no discretion to consider whether 
it was the intent of Congress to permit someone to obtain a bankruptcy discharge solely on the 
basis of having a dollar, a dime or a peppercorn located in the United States.”5 Consequently any 
property in the U.S., regardless of size, will satisfy the debtor eligibility requirement under 
Section 109(a).6 
B. Chapter 15: Cross-Border Insolvencies and Section 109(a) 
Chapter 15 has brought new issues to the application of Section 109(a). Considering a 
central aim of chapter 15 cases is the recognition of foreign proceedings to promote cross-border 
insolvencies, Section 109(a) has the potential to be a potent obstacle for many foreign debtors. 
Consequently, there has been disagreement among Circuit Courts whether Section 109(a) applies 
to chapter 15 cases. In In re Barnet, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“Applicability of Chapters”), 
the Second Circuit held that the eligibility requirement did apply to chapter 15 cases.7 In 
contrast, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that Section 
109(a) did not apply to chapter 15 cases because chapter 15 dealt with recognition of a foreign 
                                               
4 In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996). 
5 Id. 
6 See e.g., In re Farmer, 288 B.R. 31, 33 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing that courts cannot look to the 
quantity of property in the United States as “being decisive on the issue of eligibility to be a debtor under the 
Code”); but see, In re Head, 223 B.R. 648 (1998)) (holding debtors had not met the Section 109(a) standard in their 
attempts to “manufacture eligibility” by obtaining US postal addresses and opening small bank accounts in US 
banks). 
7 In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The straightforward nature of our statutory interpretation bears 
emphasis. Section 103(a) makes all of Chapter 1 applicable to Chapter 15.”). 
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proceeding, rather than a U.S. plenary bankruptcy case, and so the applicant was not required to 
reside, have a domicile, place of business, or property in the United States.8 Similarly, the 
Southern District of Florida has declined to follow In re Barnet.9 
Furthermore, in Circuits that have followed Barnet, courts have been liberal in finding 
the Section 109(a) property requirement satisfied in chapter 15 cases.10 A notable line of 
decisions stemming from In re Barnet has been the recognition that intangible property can 
satisfy Section 109(a). 
II. Intangible Property as a Method to Satisfy the Section 109(a) Requirement 
A. Chapter 7 and Chapter 11: Bank Accounts, Corporate Documents, and 
Intellectual Property Used to Gain Access to US Bankruptcy Courts 
Bank accounts have been a popular form of intangible property for foreign debtors in 
chapter 7 and chapter 11 cases.11 In In re Cenargo Int'l, PLC, a chapter 11 case, the debtors 
claimed to have property in joint bank accounts and stock pledged to secure the high yield 
notes.12 However, the debtors established this property in anticipation of a chapter 11 
restructuring and the creditors claimed this to be either improper or in bad faith because the bank 
accounts were created in anticipation of the section 109(a) requirement.13 The Court disagreed 
                                               
8 See In re Bemarmara Consulting a.s. (Case No. 13-13037 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 17, 2013). 
9 See e.g., Batista v. Mendes, No. 17-24308-Civ, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56239, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2018) 
(denying a motion to dismiss for failing to meet Section 109(a) by declining to apply the In re Barnet approach); see 
also In re Viacao Itapemirim, S.A., No. 18-24871-BKC-RAM, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 634, at *3-4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 10, 2020) (“This Court declined to follow Barnet in a prior chapter 15 case and continues to reject the Second 
Circuit's holding that § 109 applies in chapter 15 cases.”). 
10 See e.g., In re Octaviar Admin. Pty Ltd, 511 B.R. 361 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (ruling there were no additional 
elements necessary to satisfy the property requirement and the court did not have to engage in analysis of the reason 
why the debtor held that property); In re B.C.I. Finances Pty Ltd., 583 B.R. 288, 294–95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(stating that the property requirement could be satisfied by maintaining even a nominal amount of property in the 
United States, applying a similar reasoning to McTague in the chapter 15 context); In re Forge Grp. Power Pty Ltd., 
No. 17-CV-02045-PJH, 2018 WL 827913, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (“stating Section 109(a) does not set 
parameters for how much or what kind of ‘property in the United States’ is required for a person to be eligible as a 
debtor under Title 11.”). 
11 See In re Glob. Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (holding bank accounts in a chapter 
11 proceeding constituted property “regardless of how much money was actually in them on the petition date”). 
12 In re Cenargo Int'l, PLC, 294 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
13 Id. at 603. 
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with this view and opined that opening bank accounts might be prudent planning because of the 
creditors’ demand for restructuring.14 
Another form of intangible property to satisfy Secion 109(a) has been corporate 
documents in the U.S.15 Intellectual property has also been viewed as a potential form of 
property to satisfy Section 109(a) in chapter 7 and 11 cases although this has yet to be used as 
frequently as other forms of intangible property.16 
B. Chapter 15: Intangible Property a Pivotal Route to US Recognition 
 
Even with bankruptcy courts demonstrating a clear intention to accept a peppercorn to 
satisfy the property requirement for Section 109(a), the decision in In re Berau Capital Res. PTE 
Ltd. was a significant development.17 Berau filed an insolvency proceeding in Singapore, where 
the company had its headquarters.18 The company was also an obligor on over $450 million of 
U.S. dollar denominated debt governed by New York law.19 While pointing out a retainer would 
have been adequate for satisfying the property requirement, Judge Glenn concluded “that the 
presence of the New York choice of law and forum selection clauses in the Berau indenture 
satisfies the section 109(a) ‘property in the United States’ eligibility requirement.”20 Judge Glenn 
reasoned that "[c]ontracts create property rights for the parties to the contract. A debtor's contract 
rights are intangible property of the debtor."21 In foreshadowing the impact this ruling would 
have on chapter 15 cases, Judge Glenn noted that “[d]ollar denominated debt subject to New 
                                               
14 Id. 
15 See In re Paper I Partners, L.P., 283 B.R. 661, 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding original documents in a 
chapter 7 proceeding “constitutes property in the United States sufficient to satisfy section 109.”). 
16 See In re Northshore Mainland Servs., Inc., 537 B.R. 192, 200 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (determining Bahamian 
debtors’ ownership of “several trademarks registered in the United States and has several applications pending for 
the registration of additional trademarks in the United States” was likely to qualify the debtors under Section 109(a) 
in a chapter 11 proceeding). 
17 In re Berau Capital Res. PTE Ltd., 540 B.R. 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
18 Id. at 82. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 84. 
21 Id. at 83. 
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York governing law and New York forum selection are quite common in international finance” 
and “are highly desirable attributes for global trade and investment, providing certainty, 
predictability and respected courts in the event of disputes.”22 However, while conceding the 
possibility of opening US courts to more foreign proceedings, he also noted that it “would be 
ironic if a foreign debtor’s creditors could sue to enforce the debt in New York, but in the event 
of a foreign insolvency proceeding, the foreign representative could not file and obtain protection 
under chapter 15 from a New York bankruptcy court.”23 
The consequence of In re Berau has been plain to see and Judge Glenn has regularly held 
that indentures governed by New York law meet the eligibility requirements for the recognition 
of foreign bankruptcy proceedings.24 Furthermore, these debt obligations governed by US law do 
not need to be between parties in an arms-length bargain but can be negotiated between a parent 
company and its subsidiary.25 
Moreover, intangible property that has satisfied the property requirement has gone 
beyond indentures governed by US law. In In re B.C.I. Fins. Pty Ltd., Judge Lane held that a 
New York situs for fiduciary duty claims was sufficient to satisfy the property requirement.26 In 
In re U.S. Steel Can. Inc., Judge Glenn focused on the party’s contractual obligations, including 
the requirement that it “purchase all of its iron ore requirements from U.S. Steel through 2021.”27  
Judge Lane, possibly an indication of how courts will proceed in the future, adopted Judge 
                                               
22 Id. at 82-83. 
23 Id. at 83. 
24 See, In re Avanti Commc'ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 570 
B.R. 687, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Foreign Debtors have no substantial assets in the United States other than 
the New York law governed debt.”); In re Inversora Eléctrica de Buenos Aires S.A., 560 B.R. 650, 655 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding “New York law-governed debt containing a New York forum selection clause” satisfied 
the Section 109(a) requirement); In re Cell C Proprietary Ltd., 571 B.R. 542, 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Cell C 
has issued the Euro Notes which are governed by New York law and contain a New York forum selection clause” 
and so is eligible for recognition of its foreign bankruptcy proceeding). 
25 See In re Servicos de Petroleo Constellation S.A., 600 B.R. 237, 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“All of the 
principal documents setting forth Parent/Constellation's prepetition debt obligations are governed by New York law 
and generally contemplate New York as a venue for disputes.”). 
26 In re B.C.I. Fins. Pty Ltd., 583 B.R. at 297. 
27 In re U.S. Steel Can. Inc., 571 B.R. 600, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
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Glenn’s reasoning in In re Berau, citing the contention that “[c]ontracts create property rights for 
the parties to the contract” and “[a] debtor's contract rights are intangible property of the 
debtor.”28 
Conclusion 
 Section 109(a) is a challenging requirement for foreign debtors to satisfy in accessing US 
bankruptcy courts. Property has been particularly effective in allowing foreign debtors to meet 
this requirement. Courts have found no minimum amount of property is required to achieve 
eligibility. Furthermore, property that has satisfied the eligibility requirement has taken many 
forms, including intangible property, such as contractual rights, bank accounts, and corporate 
documents. 
                                               
28 In re PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk, 601 B.R. 707, 715 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
